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Introduction 
 
This paper explores the significance, and the potential significance, of “social 
accounting” in relation to one of the dominant “varieties of capitalism” (Hall and Soskice, 
2001). “Social accounting” in the previous sentence is being “usefully thought of as the 
universe of all possible accountings” (Gray, 2002, p. 692). Of particular interest here are 
two components of this universe. Firstly there is conventional financial accounting (and 
we shall allude to the existence of differing traditions within this “very constrained subset 
of social accounting” (Gray, 2002, p. 692). The second component may be thought of 
more readily as a form of social accounting if, as is arguably the case, Gray’s suggested 
terminology, although it is a liberating analytical insight, has not yet become fully 
etymologically enfranchised. This second component comprises macro social 
indicators, and in particular their potential as a “societal” accountability mechanism.  
 
A key analytical fault line in the “varieties of capitalism” literature is the dichotomy 
between the “Anglo-American” (or “Anglo-Saxon”, or “stock market”) approach and the 
various forms of “social market” (or “welfare”) capitalism (see Dore, 2000). This paper 
considers, in particular, the role of conventional financial accounting (and finance) in 
buttressing Anglo-American capitalism and contrasts this with the potential for social 
accounting, based on macro-level social indicators, to hold Anglo-American capitalism 
accountable for its social outcomes. The paper includes empirical evidence, based on a 
cross-sectional and longitudinal analysis of a particular social indicator: this evidence is 
used both as an exemplar and as a substantive issue in its own right. The particular 
indicator is child mortality, and its relationship to income inequality, which suggests a 
systemic and worsening failure of Anglo-American countries to nurture their own 
children relative to comparable developed countries on the other side of the analytical 
fault line. The results are consistent with a wider range of epidemiological evidence by 
which societal well-being may be judged (see for example Wilkinson, 2000, 2005; 
Wilkinson and Pickett, 2009).  
 
Some of the empirical evidence on child mortality presented here was first published in 
the medical literature (Collison et al., 2007) but it has also been updated to reflect the 
most recently available raw data.  Although that paper appeared in the medical 
literature, its motivation and provenance stemmed from the critique, embodied in the 
social accounting literature, of the deeply contestable values implicit in conventional 
accounting and finance practice.  Such values were subjected to detailed critical 
analysis, with direct evidence of their social impact, in Sikka et al. (1999, p. 5) who 
argued that:   
 
“The poverty, social inequality and inequitable distribution of wealth is legitimised 
not only by government policies, corporate governance structures and neo-
classical economic theories, but also by the highly visible hand of contemporary 
accounting practices.”  
 
Their impressively documented analysis was undertaken at the level of the individual 
reporting entity in the UK.  To some extent that critique is complemented by the current 
3 
 
paper in which differences in accounting traditions are implicated in countries’ relative 
social performance. 
 
 
The rest of this paper is structured as follows:  the next section considers the role of 
Anglo-American accounting and finance in reflecting, supporting and proselytizing 
Anglo-American socio-economic values and practices; this section includes 
consideration of the development and spread of neo-liberalism.  This is followed by a 
section which discusses the use of social indicators to act as an accountability 
mechanism at macro level; in particular the concepts of silent and shadow social 
accounts are proposed as having particular salience in this context.  The subsequent 
section presents comparative evidence, using a specific social indicator, of societal well 
being in the richest OECD countries.  A final section concludes. 
 
Anglo American capitalism, accounting and finance 
 
The relative superiority of the “Anglo-American” approach to economic and social 
affairs, and, in particular, the importance of maximising shareholder value (MSV) is a 
frequent and regular theme in the UK business media (Collison, 2003). At the time of 
writing, this rhetoric has arguably softened in the aftermath of the “credit crunch” but the 
critique embodied in this paper retains its relevance for a number of reasons.  
 
Firstly, and most importantly, we would contend that, even when it works as it is 
supposed to, Anglo-American capitalism leads to damaging social outcomes. Secondly, 
memories are short and notwithstanding any hubris that is now apparent, criticism of the 
system based on market failure is likely to be less effective than censure which is more 
systemic and independent of conventional and cyclical assessments of economic 
success. Indeed the market failure critique was explicitly rebuffed in an editorial in The 
Economist which, while it acknowledged the setback to the prestige of the US and UK 
economies relative to France and Germany, stated nevertheless that:  
 
If there is to be an argument about which model is best, then this newspaper 
stands firmly on the side of the liberal Anglo-Saxon model (The Economist, 
2009). The rationale advanced was that the “price to pay for more security and 
greater job protection” is “in the long run, less growth”. The appeal to economic 
growth as a deciding criterion in judging socio-economic systems is questionable 
on a number of grounds – some of which are considered in this paper. Above all, 
perhaps, it is questionable because of “limits to growth” within a finite biosphere 
(see Meadows et al., 2005; Jackson, 2009) though such considerations are not 
the focus of this paper. Thirdly, certain defenders of Anglo-American free 
markets argue that the financial crisis may have been attributable to the 
existence of such regulation as there was. It was suggested by Wellings 
(2008)[1] that, far from the crisis being attributable to inadequate regulation of 
markets, it was the existence of such regulation as there was which led investors 
to exercise inadequate care over where they placed their funds.  
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The Anglo-American form of capitalism may be distinguished from various forms of 
social market, or welfare capitalism, found in continental Europe and Japan (see, for 
example, Coates, 2000; Dore et al., 1999; Dore, 2000; Hutton, 1995, 2003).  Although 
there are various forms and traditions of social market capitalism, one identifying 
characteristic of welfare capitalist economies, at the level of the organisation, is a 
culture of balancing the interests of a range of stakeholders rather than maximising the 
interests of one group – i.e. the shareholders.  
 
The central position of corporations in distinguishing between “varieties of capitalism” is 
emphasised by Hall and Soskice (2001).  Of their celebrated analysis in which they 
“hope to build bridges between business studies and comparative political economy” 
they state that they regard “companies as the crucial actors in a capitalist economy” 
(p.6).  Hall and Soskice do not take a position on which type of capitalism is preferable 
since “both liberal and coordinated market economies seem capable of providing 
satisfactory levels of long-run economic performance”3.  In contrast to the holistic 
perspective by which corporate activity may be judged,  which is implicit in social 
accounting, Hall and Soskice also take a rather restricted view of the scope of corporate 
governance as “the sphere … to which firms turn for access to finance and in which 
investors seek assurances of returns on their investments”.   Such a position is of 
course characteristic of much of the corporate governance literature in which the 
“overwhelmingly dominant theoretical perspective” (Daily et al., 2003). is agency theory.    
 
The shareholder primacy of Anglo-American capitalism is of course embodied in the 
Anglo-American accounting tradition which emphasizes the provision of decision useful 
information for investors.  The differences in the accounting traditions which correspond 
to differing forms of capitalism, and a perspective on the unquestioned superiority of the 
Anglo-American approach,  is apparent in the following quotations taken from recent 
reports issued by professional accountancy bodies in the UK.   
 
“research on … cultural dimensions to accounting has resulted in the 
perceptions of the UK and US being classified as ‘Anglo’, with a preference for 
professionalism, flexibility, optimism and transparency4.  By contrast, in 
continental Europe, the traditional perception has been of preferences for 
secrecy, uniformity and statutory control.” (ICAS, 2006, p17) 
 
Furthermore, the same report took a rather condescending view of the expertise and 
outlook to be found in non Anglo-American accounting cultures, and went so far as to 
prescribe a removal from democratic control of the quasi-legislation that is inherent in 
accounting standards5. 
 
                                                
3 Hall and Soskice acknowledge that different forms of capitalism are associated with differing levels of 
working hours and of income inequality and also acknowledge the significance of these differences for 
well-being; but they do not pursue or take a position on these differences. 
4 The report drew on Gray (1988) as the source for these particular observations. 
5 See Richardson (2009) for a discussion of the weakening of the nation state as a “focus of governance” 
in the context of accounting and auditing standard-setting. 
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“In rolling out a principles-based accounting framework across the world, we 
accept there will be a need to re-educate those who have known nothing else 
other than working in a rules-based, often tax-oriented, accounting 
environment. We recognise that sovereignty is an issue, with politicians having 
to agree to give up their sovereignty over accounting standards in favour of an 
international but essentially private sector body.” (ICAS, 2006, p.16)  
 
A report from another leading UK accounting body revealed a similarly superior tone in 
relation to comparative approaches to corporate conduct.  Having noted that “countries 
develop corporate governance systems that reflect their economic, political and cultural 
environment” (ICAEW, 2007, p.4.) the report also stated that  
 
“It is widely believed that the US and the UK share an Anglo-American 
approach to corporate governance.  … This is significant because the success 
of US and UK capital markets encourages the desire to emulate them.”  
(ICAEW, 2007, p.4)  
 
The ICAS quotation points to accounting’s role in not only supporting Anglo-American 
capitalism, but in displacing the social market alternative, through the process known 
euphemistically as accounting harmonization which has been under way since at least 
the early 1970s.  This process, which of course has generated a large literature in its 
own right, will now be briefly considered: it is a process in which the impact of one 
subset of “social accounting” (in the universal sense) arguably has profound societal 
consequences.    
 
International accounting harmonisation 
 
The “harmonisation” process formally began in 1973 with the formation of the 
International Accounting Standards Committee (IASC).  The year is significant: it is the 
year that the UK joined the then European Economic Community (or “Common 
Market”). It has been argued (Hopwood, 1994; Flower, 1997) that the IASC was formed 
to help restrain the influence of European accounting practice;  Flower suggests that 
the: 
 
“British accounting profession was horrified at the thought of being obliged to 
accept alien accounting principles consequent on Britain’s entry into the 
European Union.  It is claimed that the hidden agenda of the IASC was to issue 
standards that reflected Anglo-American practice, which the UK (and similarly 
minded countries) could use as ammunition in its endeavours to stop the 
European Union from imposing accounting rules that conflicted with British 
practice.” 
(1997, p.288) 
 
Flower emphasised the Anglo-American background of many of the key members of  
IASC boards.  Gallhofer and Haslam (2007) also observe that ‘key boards have 
reflected Anglo-American influence and been largely constituted of representatives of 
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those with most to lose and gain from IASC/IASB activity’ and the authors place 
emphasis on ‘the IASB’s lack of formal political accountability’ (p.640).   
 
Such charges of undue Anglo-American influence on the IASC have been robustly 
disputed (see Cairns, 1997),  but the influence was indisputably formalised when the 
“Anglo American” accounting countries and the IASC itself were constituted as the “G4 
+ 1”.  The “G4” comprised the standard setters of:  Australia & New Zealand; Canada; 
the UK and Ireland; and the USA.  The “+ 1” was the IASC itself.  The orientation of this 
body to a particular approach to accounting, and also to a particular form of capitalism, 
is emphasised by Botzem and Quack (2009): 
 
“Obviously, the dominance of Anglo-American accounting – and, with it, a clear 
capital-market orientation and the emphasis on the information needs of capital 
providers – did not come about accidentally. Among the many initiatives to 
secure influence, the active engagement of national standard setters played a 
prominent role. In the early 1990s, the so-called Group of four (US, British, 
Canadian, and Australian) standard setters emerged. In 1994, it integrated the 
IASC as an observer, becoming the G4+1. The aim was to influence the future 
course of international standard setting on the basis of the frameworks already 
established in the four countries, paving the way for a clear-cut capital-market 
approach.” (p. 991) 
 
A specific and pragmatic exploration of the impact of “accounting on the social” in the 
context of the treatment of goodwill was undertaken by Ding et al. (2008). They address 
the scope for accounting rules to “help to produce the general trend towards the 
shareholder model” (p. 718). Concern about the propriety and the impact of the process 
which began with the IASC and which since 2001 has been taken over by the IASB, has 
been expressed by business and political figures in continental Europe. In 2009 the 
head of a leading French insurance company attacked the IASB as being “accountable 
to no one”, stating that the setting of accounting norms was “an instrument of political 
sovereignty” and “far too important to leave to accountants” (Daneshkhu and Hughes, 
2009). The chair of the European Parliament’s Economics and Monetary Affairs 
Committee stated in 2005 that the role of the US-dominated IASB could lead to “the 
financialisation of the [world] economy” which could itself result in “management boards 
being more concerned about financial markets than about the true economic well-being 
of the company” (Wolfe, 2006). The “discourse of shareholder value creation and the 
development of related accounting metrics” is emphasised by Ezzamel et al. (2008, p. 
107) as central to the hegemonic position and reassertion of capital. An important 
conduit for this discourse is the media whose contribution to the discourse will now be 
briefly considered.  
 
Accounting and finance values and the business media  
 
Proselytising by the business media has complemented and reinforced the impact of 
accounting on social market economies.  It is entirely consistent with the values and 
techniques embodied in the Anglo-American accounting and finance tradition, and can 
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be explicitly aimed at making social market countries more shareholder friendly by 
changing their business and social cultures. Western European governments have been 
described as “overburdened by social security commitments” such that “Shareholder 
value cannot be released as aggressively as it has been in the US” (Riley, 1996). The 
primacy of shareholder value, at the explicit expense of other interests and wider social 
concerns, was exemplified by Collison (2003) in some examples drawn from the 
Financial Times (FT):  
 
“Plender (1997) wrote in the FT of deregulation of European labour markets 
continuing at “snail’s pace” as "treasured social cohesion" impeded “a more 
robust, Anglo-Saxon style of capitalism”. An FT feature on the Japanese 
economy described in similarly mocking terms Japan’s "cherished social 
contract", noting that it was no longer viable and calling for "a more flexible 
labour market"  … An editorial (FT, 2000) prescribes for Japan “the discipline of 
modern management and accounting” while another bemoans the social barriers 
to “widespread restructuring” (FT, 1999).”   (Collison, 2003, p.874) 
 
Further examples include the lead article in a major Financial Times supplement on 
Japanese corporate finance which noted disapprovingly (Abrahams, 1999) that “the 
conversion of executives to shareholder value is not always entirely wholehearted”. 
Elsewhere it pointed out that “Japan Inc will no longer be able to afford lifetime 
employment” and that “the social dislocation could be huge” but that these effects are 
the “consequences of a greater emphasis on the cost and return of capital”.  In a very 
explicit indication of the contribution that accounting can make to changing socio-
economic culture, Nakamoto (1999), also in the FT, stated that the forthcoming 
implementation of consolidated accounting, would help to change attitudes by 
highlighting poor profit performance of  subsidiaries’ impacts on profits. 
 
The dismantling of the Japanese social consensus was commended by the FT Lex 
Column (Lex, 1999) which favourably compared its investment potential as a result of 
“corporate restructuring”, with bad news for European holdings:  it noted “widespread 
scepticism about Europe’s stomach to push through the structural reforms” which “it 
desperately needs”. 	
 
Change, of the sort urged above, has indeed come to Japan.  Writing in 2006, Dore,  a 
long-time observer of its socio-economic and business culture, traced the way political 
rhetoric and deliberate policy changes reflected a desire for “economic reform”.  But he 
regarded these as relatively insignificant compared to the “the big change, the 
‘shareholder revolution’, the fundamental shift in what managers consider their job to 
be.” (Dore, 2006, p.22).   A key influence on Japanese business practice, according to 
Dore, is the rise to positions of influence of high flying students who studied for MBAs 
and PhDs in the US in the 1970s and 80s:  “These true believers in agency theory and 
shareholder value have become a dominant voice in ministries and boardrooms” (p.24).  
Some striking figures issued by the Japanese Ministry of Finance and cited by Dore 
have disturbing implications for traditional Japanese social cohesion.  The figures are 
for the comparable four year periods 1986-1990 and 2001-2005 when in each case 
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Japan was recovering from recession.   During the two periods, value added per firm 
rose by similar amounts (6.8% and 7.9% respectively), but wages per employee which 
had risen by 19.1% in the first period fell by 5.8% in the second.  Remuneration of 
directors however, which had increased by 22.2% in the first period, rose by 97.3% in 
the second;  increases in profits per firm  were 28.4% in the first period and 90.0% in 
the second while equivalent increases for dividends were 1.6% and 174.8%. 
 
There is growing concern in Japan over the social impact of such changes in income 
distribution with a much quoted consequence being the increasing proportions of school 
children qualifying for free school meals. But Dore notes that there is as yet no political 
force to mobilize the growing resentment and “Until that happens “investors can relax”.  
Such proselytising and intensification of the values embedded within Anglo-American 
capitalism has been termed neo-liberalism:  this phenomenon will now be considered. 
 
Anglo-American capitalism and neo-liberalism 
 
In one sense Anglo-American capitalism predates neo-liberalism.  The structural 
differences, in terms of corporate financing and accounting traditions, between Anglo-
American and social market forms of capitalism have existed for a considerable time.  
But the longitudinal account given by Collison et al, (2007), which will be considered 
below, is consistent with a relative social decline of the Anglo-American countries over 
recent decades.  During this period the shareholder value rhetoric has been intensified 
and this, reflected and supported by the Anglo-American accounting tradition, has 
arguably has been a key component of neo-liberal practices and policies.  The term 
“neo-liberalism” is defined by by Willis, Smith & Stenning (2008, p.1) as: "a set of ideas 
and practices centred on an increased role for the free market, flexibility in labour 
markets and a reconfiguration of state welfare activities". Its trajectory and significance 
was outlined by Duggan (2003, p.10): 
 
"Neo-liberalism, a political label retrospectively applied to the 'conservative' 
policies of the Reagan and Thatcher regimes in the United States and Great 
Britain, rocketed to prominence as the brand name for the form of pro-corporate, 
'free-market', anti-'big government' rhetoric shaping Western national policy and 
dominating international financial institutions since the early 1980s."  
 
Pattison (2008, p.92) noted the pervasiveness of the concept when he stated that 
"Since the 1970s, neo-liberalism has diffused 'from a gleam in Friedrich Hayek's eye to 
become everyday discourse and practice' (Leitner et al., 2007, p.1) to varying degrees 
around the world". Neo-liberalism's impact, trajectory and origins are also highlighted by 
Brenner & Theodore's (2002, p.2) statement that "[t]his 'utopia of unlimited exploitation' 
(Bourdieu, 1998) can be traced to the postwar writings of Friedrich Hayek and Milton 
Friedman, [although] neo-liberalism first gained widespread political prominence during 
the late 1970s and early 1980s".  
 
The beginnings of neo-liberalism have been traced by Duggan (2003, p.xii) to the 
1940s, however she does acknowledge that its policies of "fiscal austerity, privatization, 
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market liberalization, and government stabilization" have been most vivid since the 
1980s.  The theory's dominance is asserted by Navarro (2007, p.iii) who argues that it 
“has guided the globalization of economic activity and become the conventional wisdom 
in international agencies and institutions”.    He has argued (Navarro, 2007, p.1) that 
neo-liberal policies applied to the “international economic order became known as 
globalization."  But this is a site of some terminological controversy: for example Rapley 
(2004, p.9) has declared that "Critics of the new global economy have unwittingly 
bought the neo-liberal line that conflates globalization with neo-liberalism".  Such 
conflation has been critiqued  in the influential work of Hirst and Thompson (1996).  
They emphasise their concern that undue acceptance of the notion of globalisation may 
serve to vitiate the possibility of political (i.e. democratic) strategy “to promote social 
goals”.  A key element of the current paper is the heterogeneity of forms of capitalism, 
and the vulnerability of social-market economies to the economic imperialism of Anglo-
American (or neo-liberal) socio-economic culture.  This recognition is consistent with the 
position of Hirst and Thompson, as is the central thesis that the visibilities provided by 
social accounting can contribute to political will.  
 
    Such visibility is important given the hegemonic influence of neo-liberalism as 
described by Duggan (2003) who notes (p.10)  that " 'neo-liberalism is usually 
presented not as a particular set of interests and political interventions, but as a kind of 
nonpolitics - a way of being reasonable, and of promoting universally desirable forms of 
economic expansion”  Navarro too remarked (2007, p.iii) that "this ideology has guided 
policies widely accepted as the only ones possible and advisable." Indeed, Harvey 
(2005, p.3) concluded that "Neo-liberalism has, in short, become hegemonic as a mode 
of discourse. It has pervasive effects on ways of thought to the point where it has 
become incorporated into the common-sense way many of us interpret, live in, and 
understand the world."  Such a hegemonic perspective is of course mirrored in the 
“technical rationality” of accounting and finance practice.    
 
The intellectual basis of neo-liberalism was critiqued by Stiglitz (2001, p.vii) in his 
foreword to Karl Polyani's classic text, first published in 1944, Great transformation: the 
political and economic origins of our time:  "Polyani's analysis makes it clear that 
popular doctrines of trickle-down economics - that all, including the poor, benefit from 
growth - have little historical support"; he went on to state that (p. viii) "Today, there is 
no respectable intellectual support for the proposition that markets, by themselves, lead 
to efficient, let alone equitable outcomes."  
 
Harvey (2005, p.159) reported that "The main substantive achievement of neo-
liberalism, however, has been to redistribute, rather than to generate, wealth and 
income.". Indeed, in his review of world income distribution over the 1980s and 1990s of 
neo-liberal policy implementation, Wade (p.129 in Navarro, 2007) noted that changes 
reducing equality in this distribution are the result of a "shift in corporate culture from a 
norm of 'earned differentials' to a norm of 'winner take all'" which is in turn related to 
neo-liberal policy's "financialization of the economy". Such negative impacts on equality 
have been noted by others; for example, Duggan (2003, p.10) noted the "rapidly 
expanding, vast economic inequalities that neo-liberal policies have generated in the 
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United States, in Great Britain, and globally". Similarly, Rapley (2004, p.87) wrote that 
neo-liberalism's implementation saw "income differentials widened in most Western 
societies - and it is worth noting that the effect was most pronounced in the United 
States, where the market is most free"; Duggan (2003, p.67) too noted neo-liberalism's 
"stunning success in redistributing the world's resources ever upward". Indeed, Harvey 
(2005, p.119) highlighted "the universal tendency [of neo-liberalization] to increase 
social inequality" and claimed "Redistributive effects and increasing social inequality 
have in fact been such a persistent feature of neo-liberalization as to be regarded as 
structural to the whole project." (Harvey, 2005, p.16); perhaps this is why Thatcher 
(Wade, 2007) has been quoted as saying "It is our job to glory in inequality".  
 
"While the various critiques of neo-liberalization have been extensive,... few have 
engaged explicitly with debates over social justice”. (Willis, Smith & Stenning, 2008, 
p.7).  The evidence presented in this paper suggests that Anglo-American business 
culture and the accounting methods used to calibrate and emphasise the performance 
of its commercial organizations, contribute to social outcomes which, at the very least, 
should cause them to be questioned.  These are outcomes which could form the basis 
of a more complete account of how stakeholder interests are served. In doing so, such 
an account would recognise the need for a systemic analysis of socio-economic issues 
within a wider institutional context of global capitalism, and a recognition of different 
types of capitalism, that may enable society to ‘name the problem’ (Miller and Hubbard, 
2005; see also Stiglitz, 2003).  Such critiques frequently assert the importance to 
society of wider (democratic) accountability by the institutions regulating global capital, 
as well as the role of specific mechanisms in discharging that accountability. Current 
macro-level disclosures relating to social as well as economic performance of, inter alia, 
the US and UK could therefore operate as key accountability mechanisms in this 
context.  We argue in this paper that the development of alternative ‘silent’ and/or 
‘shadow’ accounts of socio-economic performance could systematically create new 
visibilities.  These may be valuable as a basis for problematising and challenging 
dominant forms of economic organisation and the rhetoric which privileges certain 
interests as well as a commensurately selective approach to accountability mechanisms 
(Dey et al., 2008). 
 
Silent/shadow accounts and social indicators (best title??) 
 
Gray (1997) proposed that it should be possible to produce an external, or ‘shadow’, 
social account of an organisation’s activities by systematically collating and verifying 
wider publicly available information sources from agencies such as governments, NGOs 
and other civil society groups, and the wider media. In addition, Gray proposed that 
such an account could be juxtapositioned against internal organisational sources of 
social and environmental information, including not only (where available) formal 
corporate standalone reports, but also what may be considered ‘silent’ disclosures, such 
as press releases, stock market announcements and other forms of public 
communications. In this way, shadow and silent accounts might provide new insights 
into an organisation’s social and environmental impacts and reveal contradictions 
between what they choose to report and what they omit or suppress (Dey, 2007). Prior 
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experiments with such accounts have been referred to using a number of different 
terms, including social audits (Medawar, 1976), deindustrialisation audits (Harte and 
Owen, 1987), silent accounts (Gray, 1997), shadow accounts (Gibson et al., 2001), 
portrayal gap analysis (Adams, 2004), social accounts (Cooper et al., 2005) and counter 
accounts (Gallhofer et al., 2006). Despite differences in their names, when taken 
together it may be argued that:  
 
“[such experiments] share a number of important characteristics, in that 
they systematically create alterative representations, new visibilities and 
knowledge of existing situations in order to problematise and act as a 
catalyst for change and intervention”. Dey et al. (2008, p. 2) 
 
Most prior experiments in shadow accounting have chosen the corporation as the 
subject for examination, but the accounting ‘entity’ could also be defined in other ways, 
with a focus on a wider issue or cause (Cooper, et al, 2005).  Examples of such “macro” 
applications of social accounting do not abound in the accounting literature but see, for 
example, Russell and Thomson (2009) who, in a national (Scottish) context, “view 
sustainable development indicators as a social and environment accounting technology” 
(p.226).  And a notable set of studies  which explicitly considered macro social 
indicators also appeared in a special section of Accounting Organizations and Society in 
1981.  The special section, introduced by Dierkes (1981) was “devoted to the memory” 
of Raymond Bauer, a pioneer in the development of both social indicators and 
“corporate social accounting”.  According to Glatzer, the concept of social indicators 
was “elaborated for the first time” in the book Social Indicators (Bauer, 1966 cited in 
Glatzer,1981) although he also acknowledges that similar ideas were anticipated by the 
United Nations in the 1950s  (some more recent initiatives of the UN are outlined 
below).  
 
The cognate sense of the two broad areas of Bauer’s work is encapsulated in Dierkes 
(1981):  
 
“I view this memorial section as a starting point for further research including the 
concept of social indicators as a tool to measure the performance of social 
institutions in general, and the idea of corporate social reporting as an effort to 
make business management more sensitive and responsive to social needs 
beyond fulfilling their traditional economic role. (p. 217) 
 
The other papers in the special section addressed both macro social indicators (Park & 
Petersen, 1981) and corporate social reporting (Heard & Bolce, 1981 and Preston, 
1981).  In this paper, we define the accounting entity as the nation state; and, for 
comparative purposes, we consider the wealthiest OECD nations. Of course, it is 
abundantly clear that countries, and their governments, are subject to constant scrutiny 
and critical comment, arguably more so than is the case for corporations. However, as 
with corporations, much of this apparent scrutiny is driven by powerful vested interests – 
particularly in the media.  Whether the interests of the wider demos are reflected in the 
agenda, and resulting focus, of the mainstream media is, of course, debatable to say 
12 
 
the least (see for example, Carey, 1997; Curran, 1977, Herman and Chomsky, 1988; 
Miller and Dinan, 2008).  Nonetheless, the use of external or ‘counter’ information by 
civil society organisations in campaigning against particular state-level (as well as 
corporate) activities has a long history, and has in recent years been helped greatly by a 
variety of factors, including the grass-roots activism of various social movements and 
campaigning pressure groups (see, for example, Lubbers, 2003) and (perhaps most 
importantly) the relative ease of access to ‘counter-information’ on the internet 
(Gallhofer et al., 2006).  
 
Of course, long before the advent of information technology, the emancipatory potential 
of potentially silent social indicators was used to some effect through the application of 
painstaking scholarship. In his biography of Marx, Berlin (1939, pp.182-3) described 
how “[T]hose pieces of detailed social and historical research” which, in his view, 
formed the “best and most original chapters in Das Kapital” were based on evidence 
from, inter alia, the “government Blue Books (which he was the first scholar to put to 
serious scientific use)”.  Berlin went further in emphasising the novelty and significance 
of the use of such evidence6: 
 
“The technique of social research was revolutionised by the example set by Marx 
in the use of Blue Books and official reports:  he claimed to base the greater part 
of his detailed indictment of modern industrialism largely upon them.” (Berlin, pp. 
134-5) 
 
The importance of social indicators, in fact their status as a sine qua non for democratic 
accountability, was asserted by Eagleton (1987) in a critical commentary of Charles 
Dickens’ Hard Times: “No project of social reform can dispense with hard data, which 
properly handled and interpreted can be explosive in their effects.” (p.296).  Based on 
one of the book’s key characters, Mr Gradgrind, this celebrated novel introduced the 
term “gradgrindery” into the language, to describe disdain for aspects of human 
existence which cannot be objectively measured.  Perhaps in an indirect defence of 
Marx, Eagleton suggests that: “Dickens buys his protests against the cult of facts rather 
too cheaply, with his easy sneers at Gradgrind’s ‘blue books’.” 
 
In seeking to identify ‘shadow’ or ‘silent’ information to problematise the activities of 
political entities (and thereby the ideological institutions with which they are identified 
and which they may imbue with a facade of democratic respectability), an obvious 
avenue of development is ‘alternative’ social and economic indicators. Diener and Suh 
(1997) argue that the use of social indicators to gauge individuals’ subjective view of 
their quality of life is necessary to add to policy makers’ appreciation of the fortunes of 
different groups within a society’s population.  Within the social indicators literature, 
varying approaches towards the determination of the quality of life have been identified, 
with each one supported by different philosophies about what constitutes a good life.  
                                                
6 Berlin also emphasised the warm tribute paid to the British Factory inspectors whose “fearless and 
unbiased reports” were declared by Marx “to be a uniquely honourable phenomenon in the history of 
bourgeois society”. 
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During the 1960s and early 1970s, a ‘social indicators movement’7 grew amongst 
sections of society who were becoming increasingly dissatisfied with the limited 
information available to governmental decision-makers (Carley, 1981; see also Glatzer, 
1981).  The suitability of GNP as the measurement of achievement in welfare goals 
such as improved health and standard of living was frequently questioned (see, for 
example, Christian, 1974; Galnoor, 1974; Goeke, 1974; Liu, 1974; Seashore, 1974).  
The increased interest in policy decisions promoting human welfare throughout the 
1960s and early 1970s was one consequence of the significant growth in the economies 
of most OECD member countries during this period; queries were raised over whether 
the benefits of the expanding economies were reaching all members of these societies.  
This interest in social indicators reflected the belief held by OECD ministers at the time 
that: 
 
“growth is not an end in itself, but rather an instrument for creating better 
conditions of life [and] increased attention must be given to the qualitative 
aspects of growth, and to the formulation of policies with respect to the 
broad economic and social choices involved in the allocation of growing 
resources”  (OECD, 1976, p.7) 
By the 1980s, the decade that experienced the Thatcher government of the UK 
and the Reagan administration in the US, economic indicators again resumed their 
supreme dominance as the over-riding measurements of these countries’ success 
and consequently have continued to dominate the policies of their governments. 
Nevertheless, work on the development of alternatives to GDP has continued in 
various parts of civil society8. A range of other social indices feature in many 
research studies, particularly those conducted under the auspices of the UN.   For 
example, the Human Development Reports issued by the United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP) highlight, amongst a range of other specific 
indices, the Human Development Index (HDI).  The HDI is a composite index 
based on measures of life expectancy, literacy and education and GDP per capita.  
Other examples of composite indices produced by the UNDP include the human 
poverty index (HPI) of which there are two separate measures – HPI-1 for 
developing countries, and HPI-2 for selected OECD countries; the gender-related 
development index (GDI), and the gender empowerment measure (GEM).  
                                                
7 In this paper we do not attempt to review the social indicators literature per se, though we aim to give a 
reasonable context for the ideas advanced.   Indeed Glatzer stated (in 1981) that its “breadth and 
diversity” meant that “no one social scientist can hope to provide an adequate survey of  the relevant 
literature."  A specialist journal, Social Indicators Research, has been published since 1974. 
8 Particularly noteworthy is in this respect is the ongoing initiative by the UK NGO Friends of the Earth 
and the New Economics Foundation to develop an Index of Sustainable Economic Welfare (ISEW) (see 
www.foe.co.uk/campaigns/sustainable_development/progress/). Originally developed in the late 1980s 
(Daly and Cobb, 1989), ISEW attempts to adjust basic GDP by adding (or more often subtracting) a range 
of different economic, social and environmental indicators. Although clearly not without its own limitations, 
early evidence from this ISEW initiative suggests that, while prosperity may still be rising very slowly in 
some western industrialised countries, it is doing so at a greatly reduced rate compared to ‘conventional’ 
GDP. More significantly there is evidence that prosperity measured by a similar instrument, called the 
Genuine Progress Indicator, in the USA is actually decreasing.  
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Another commonly used social indicator is the Gini coefficient that measures 
income inequality9.   
 
The story of the intellectual and pragmatic provenance of the Human Development 
Reports - the “brainchild” of Mahbub ul Haq - has been told by Amartya Sen (Sen, 2000) 
who was one of Haq’s colleagues in the enterprise and the principal author of the HDI. 
The limitations of any single metric are emphasised by Sen since ‘human development’ 
accounting: 
 
“involves a systematic examination of a wealth of information about how human 
beings in each society live … It brings an inescapably pluralist conception of 
progress to the exercise of development evaluation. Human lives are battered 
and diminished in all kinds of different ways, and the first task, seen in this 
perspective, is to acknowledge that deprivations of very different kinds have to be 
accommodated within a general overarching  framework. The framework must 
be cogent and coherent, but must not try to overlook the pluralities that are 
crucially involved (in the diverse nature of deprivations) in a misguided search for 
some one measure of success and failure, some single clue to all the other 
disparate concerns.” (Sen, 2000,  p.18) 
 
The design of social indicators can also be problematic since selection of the 
appropriate data to be included in any measurement may involve a subjective choice 
(Carley, 1981).  Even when a particular phenomenon is chosen, definitions of what 
constitutes a particular state are often not straightforward and may be capable of some 
manipulation e.g. unemployment figures. Further, “quality of life” data may be criticised 
on the grounds of subjectivity. Furthermore, and notwithstanding the caution expressed 
by Sen regarding “one measure of success”, social indicators which are based on 
aggregated data10 have two potential shortcomings.   
Firstly, aggregated data is open to inherent criticism regarding the appropriate 
weightings of the component indicators.  Lind (forthcoming) argues that “The weightings 
of the four component indicators of the UNDP’s Human Development Index HDI appear 
to be arbitrary and have not been given justification”.  He suggests a variant of the HDI 
based on “peoples’ revealed evaluations”.  Furthermore Ullman (1976) emphasises the 
accentuation of the problem of aggregation in a "comprehensive system of social 
accounting".  He notes, citing Gambling (1973), that a basic axiom of accounting theory 
is that “aggregation is both possible and reasonable". 
                                                
9 Atkinson et al. (2002) comment that this measure is more sensitive to differences between middle 
income countries than between extremely rich or poor nations Within the epidemiological literature it has 
been noted that the Gini coefficient is losing popularity as an inequality measure and that there is no clear 
consensus about an alternative (Gwatkin, 2000). 
10 Aggregated data is also open to inherent criticism regarding the appropriate weightings of the 
component indicators.  Lind (forthcoming)  argues that “The weightings of the four component indicators 
of the UNDP’s Human Development Index HDI appear to be arbitrary and have not been given 
justification”.  He  suggests a variant of the HDI based on “peoples’ revealed evaluations”.   
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Secondly, and particularly in the context of the case put forward by this paper, 
composite measures may have less immediacy, and therefore less impact and 
emancipatory potential, than more readily assimilated individual measures, some 
startling examples of which are reported in this paper.  The next section adduces 
evidence regarding the relative performance of Anglo-American and social market 
economies in relation to child mortality. 
 
Problematising forms of capitalism: Income inequality and child mortality 
In turning our attention towards more specific social indicators that may be used to 
create alternative representations of the performance of wealthy nations, we identified 
the field of epidemiology as a potentially relevant source of data. Population health is a 
particularly useful type of social indicator because it reflects the overall environment and 
social structures in which people live. For example, an important exemplar of the 
relationship between health and society is the so-called ‘epidemiological transition’, 
where the effect of rising material prosperity on the living standards of the population is 
clearly demonstrated by the eradication of many infectious diseases and other such 
preventable causes of death, with a resultant dramatic improvement in life expectancy 
and infant mortality statistics.  
 
However, while such differences in population health between either end of the 
epidemiological transition may illustrate the benefits of material prosperity to population 
health, the relationship between wealth and health is noticeably less straightforward 
amongst those nations on the prosperous side of the transition. A focus on absolute 
levels of income and wealth does not explain why some rich countries exhibit lower 
levels of population health than relatively poorer countries. Instead, epidemiological 
research has identified differences in relative, rather than absolute, income as a more 
likely determinant of population health within wealthy countries.  
 
To illustrate this argument in more detail, particular emphasis in this section will be 
given to the results reported in a paper (Collison et al., 2007) which appeared in the 
medical literature11 but which has its origins within the accounting and finance discipline. 
The motivation for the study reported in that paper was precisely the triumphalist 
rhetoric about the superiority of the Anglo-American business culture, which was 
reported earlier in this paper. This rhetoric, as preceding examples demonstrated could 
exhibit explicit disdain for social values.  It appeared that business success, as 
measured by accountants could be viewed as an end in itself and not as a means to an 
end of a prosperous and socially cohesive society. This inference led to the comparative 
investigation of one particular social indicator, i.e. child mortality figures, for the 
wealthiest OECD countries.  
 
This indicator was chosen because of its objectivity, its ready availability in annual 
UNICEF publications, and because the ability of a country to nurture its own children 
seemed a particularly telling measure of societal health.  The data reported in Collison 
                                                
11 The paper appeared in the Journal of Public Health which is published on behalf of The Faculty of 
Public Health of the Royal Colleges of Physicians of the United Kingdom. 
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et al., (2007) was taken from the series of annual UNICEF publications:  “State of the 
World's Children” for the years 2003 to 2006 inclusive.  The data in these reports is 
typically given two years in arrears:  thus the data in the 2003 report related to 2001 etc.  
In addition, some earlier data is also given in the reports and this facilitated a 
longitudinal perspective on comparative child mortality rates.  
 
Three key findings were reported in the paper:  a ranking of the most recently reported 
child mortality figures themselves (averaged over the four most recent years for which 
data was available, i.e. the  years 2001-4); an investigation of correlations between 
these figures and income inequality data; and changes in countries’ comparative 
performance since 1960.  Income inequality was measured in two ways, with very 
similar results in each case.  One measure was an “Income Inequality Ratio” (IIR) 
constructed from percentage shares, given in the UNICEF reports, of national 
household income received by the 20% of households with the highest, and by the 40% 
of households with the lowest, incomes; the second measure was the Gini coefficient.  
The Pearson correlation coefficient showed a strong (0.1% level) association between 
income inequality and child mortality in each case with values for r of 0.76 and 0.77 for 
the IIR and the Gini coefficient respectively. 
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Table 1: Rankings of Under Five Child Mortality Rate (U5MR) amongst the wealthier OECD 
countries (and income ranking for 2003) 
 
Country 
 
Mean  
U5MR 
2001-4 
Mean 
2001-4 
Rank 
 
U5MR 
1990 
 
1990 
Rank 
U5MR 
1960 
1960 
Rank 
GNI/cap 
2003 
$ 
GNI 
Rank 
Mean 
U5MR 
2005-7 
Sweden 3.25 1 7 2= 20 1 28,840 8 3.33 
Iceland 3.75 2 7 2= 22 2= 30,810 7 3.00 
Norway 4.00 3 9 6= 23 4 43,350 2 4.00 
Denmark 4.25 4 9 6= 25 6 33,750 5 4.67 
Japan 4.50 5 6 1 40 16= 33,750 6 4.00 
Finland 4.75 6 7 2= 28 10 27,020 10 4.00 
Austria 5.00 7= 10 15= 43 19 26,720 12 4.67 
Germany 5.00 7= 9 6= 40 16= 25,250 15 4.33 
Greece 5.00 7= 11 21= 64 22 13,720 22 4.33 
Italy 5.25 10= 9 6= 50 20 21,560 19 4.00 
Korea, Rep of 5.25 10= 9 6= 127 24 12,030 24 5.00 
Luxembourg 5.25 10= 10 15= 41 18 43,940 1 4.00 
Spain 5.25 10= 9 6= 57 21 16,990 20 4.33 
Belgium 5.50 14= 10 15= 35 14 25,820 14 4.67 
France 5.50 14= 9 6= 34 13 24,770 16 4.33 
Netherlands 5.50 14= 9 6= 22 2= 26,310 13 5.00 
Portugal 5.50 14= 14 24 112 23 12,130 23 4.67 
Switzerland 5.50 14= 9 6= 27 8= 39,880 3 5.00 
Australia 6.00 19= 10 15= 24 5 21,650 18 6.00 
Ireland 6.00 19= 10 15= 36 15 26,960 11 5.00 
New Zealand 6.00 19= 11 21= 26 7 15,870 21 6.00 
Canada 6.50 22= 8 5 33 12 23,930 17 6.00 
United Kingdom 6.50 22= 10 15= 27 8= 28,350 9 6.00 
United States 8.00 24 12 23 30 11 37,610 4 7.67 
Adapted from Collison et al., (2007); and updated. 
 
The 24 richest12 OECD countries were compared and are listed in Table 1.  Table 1 
includes the data which was reported in Collison et al., (2007) as well as, in the final 
column only, more recent aggregated data on child mortality for the years 2005-2007.  
The following discussion relates, initially, to the earlier data and analysis and is followed 
by consideration of the more recent figures.  In terms of absolute performance for child 
mortality, the best figure was that for Sweden with a mean death rate for the years 
2001-2004 of 3.25 per 1000 live births.  The remaining top six places were occupied by 
the other Nordic countries and Japan.  The next 12 countries in terms of performance 
were all continental European countries apart from the Republic of Korea, with rates 
from 5 to 5.5.  The bottom six places were occupied by the six Anglo-American 
countries, with rates from 6 to 8:  worst of all was the US.  
 
                                                
12 The remaining countries: Czech Republic, Hungary, Mexico, Poland, Slovakia and Turkey, were 
excluded since their income levels were considerably lower than those of the other countries.  
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The key finding was the very significant (at the 0.1% level) statistical association 
between child mortality and income inequality.  Earlier studies in the medical literature 
(Lynch, et al., 2001; Spencer, 2004) had attributed this link to the influence of the US, 
which was highest for both measures.  However, a very strong relationship, which had 
not previously been identified, persisted when the US was removed from the analysis 
which suggests, particularly in the light of the performance of the group of Anglo 
American countries, a more systemic, and underlying, explanation for the figures.  The 
Anglo-American countries’ relative performance had also worsened over time as can be 
seen from Table 1.  When the 24 countries were ranked in order of worsening child 
mortality, their position had slipped from the upper and middle of the pack in 1960 to the 
very bottom by the beginning of the twentieth century.  This period encompasses the 
development of neo-liberalism and the increasingly shrill, Anglo-American, emphasis on 
maximising shareholder value.  
 
In the case of GNI per capita, the evidence is markedly different with no support 
for rejection of the equivalent null hypothesis (that there is no correlation between better 
child mortality and higher GNI per capita): indeed there was weak evidence of a 
negative correlation.  These figures are clearly a “rich country” phenomenon.  On the 
global scale, there is overwhelming evidence that increased GNI/capita is associated 
with reduced child mortality.  Of course the U5MR figures for the world’s poorest 
countries13 are very much higher than those discussed in this paper due to the effect of 
the epidemiological transition.   
 
The more recent 2005-7 child mortality data which is reported in Table 1 also showed 
an extremely significant correlation (at the 0.1% level) with the Gini income inequality 
index as published in the 2008 UN Human Development Report.  As with the earlier 
data a strong statistical association (at the 1% level) was maintained when the US was 
excluded from the analysis.  While minor changes to the rankings and a general, 
absolute improvement are apparent in the 2005-7 figures, the overall relative pattern is 
clearly maintained. 
 
The importance of income inequality in the Collison et al. study is corroborated by 
review of the wider epidemiology literature: in a comprehensive review of empirical work 
on the association between income distribution and population health, Wilkinson and 
Pickett (2006) classified 155 published studies according to how far their findings 
supported the hypothesis that greater income differences are associated with lower 
standards of population health. Of the 45 studies within the sample that used nation-
states as the geographical object of analysis, 30 were classified as wholly supportive 
and nine classified as partially supportive of that hypothesis.  
 
                                                
13 Although the key motivation for this paper is to challenge and question the arrogance of Anglo-
American ideology and its capacity for harm in the developed world, the threat that it poses to the 
underdeveloped world through the imposition of IMF and World Bank inspired “structural adjustment 
programs” (see Stiglitz, 2003) is also relevant, though beyond the scope of this paper.  
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In addition to infant mortality, other strong statistical associations between income 
inequality and societal well being, which have been observed, include: death rates 
(Ross et al., 2005); life expectancy (de Vogli et al, 2005); obesity (Pickett et al., 2005a), 
and homicide and violent crime (Pickett et al., 2005b, Fajnzylber and Lederman, 2002).  
 
Causal relationships between health, inequality and capitalism 
Given the statistical associations between income inequality and various indicators of 
population health outlined in the previous section, attention may be turned to the nature 
of the causal relationship (if any) between these variables. The fact that more unequal 
income distributions are associated with higher rates of infant mortality – for countries 
with broadly comparable income levels is hardly surprising, given that “infant mortality is 
concentrated among the poor” (Waldmann, 1992).  He succinctly observes that if the 
rich are richer then, for average incomes to be equal, the poor are poorer.  It is also of 
course apparent, from inspection of the figures presented in the previous section, that 
countries with comparatively low average incomes may have lower child mortality than 
those with a higher average, and there is a clear prima facie case for arguing that this 
too is at least partly attributable to more equitable income shares.  
 
However, and counter intuitively, Waldmann has also adduced evidence to show 
that in a comparison of two countries “in which the poor have equal real incomes, the 
one in which the rich are wealthier is likely to have a higher infant mortality rate” 
(emphasis in the original).   Similar observations have been recorded in other contexts, 
thus in a review of the work in this area Kohn (2001, p.40) states: 
 
“Around the world, the figures suggest that unequal societies are unhealthy 
societies.  Most of these data concern mortality statistics, as these are 
more reliable than other measures of health.  The distinction between 
absolute and relative poverty corresponds to the “epidemiological transition” 
– the shift from conditions in which infectious diseases are the major killers 
to ones in which the diseases of affluence are the most feared.  Above this 
transition point, absolute wealth makes little difference to life expectancy.  
Greeks are healthier than Americans, although average American incomes 
are more than twice as high. The objection that this may represent the 
superiority of the Mediterranean diet over the hamburger is countered by 
comparison among US states. The states with larger gaps between rich 
and poor have higher death rates, even after controlling for factors as 
diverse as poverty, race and tobacco. Within developed countries in 
general, death rates at the lowest levels of the social hierarchy are between 
two and four times higher than those at the top.” 
 
A persuasive rationale for the argument that inequality not only leads to increased child 
mortality through the deprivation normally associated with poverty, but that inequality 
per se kills, is given by Wilkinson (2000, p.3):   
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“it turns out that this is probably because more equal societies are less stressful:  
people are more likely to trust each other and are less hostile and violent towards 
each other.” 14 
 
The notion that inequality is bad for our health, regardless of our absolute standard of 
material wealth, has been developed to suggest that the close relationship between 
income inequality and population health is associated with an equally close relationship 
between income inequality and the quality of social relations. Wilkinson (2005) cites a 
number of empirical studies that demonstrate correlations between income inequality 
and measures of trust (Uslaner, 2002) and social capital (Putnam, 2000). Highly 
significant correlations between income inequality and emotional distress amongst the 
richest OECD countries have also been observed (James, 2008). 
 
A telling synopsis of the explanatory factors put forward by Wilkinson (2005) is provided 
in a review by Toynbee.  In it she emphasises the role of the psycho-social factors of 
stigma and social exclusion: 
 
It is not primarily five-a-day fruit and veg or obesity that need targeting, but 
 social injustice itself. Infant mortality is mainly a result of low-birth weight 
 babies, …. Wilkinson shows that these days small premature babies are not 
 caused by bad diet: even poor nutrition by British standards will rarely harm a 
 foetus. It is stress in pregnancy that does it, high cortisol levels which affect 
 the foetus for life - and poorer mothers are more depressed, with less social 
 support. …This book is evidence for what common sense already knows. 
 Children on free school meals, with no holidays to talk about, unable to afford 
 the school trips, who never invite anyone back to a shabby home, painfully 
 understand their place in the hierarchy from their first day at school. Adults 
 know the same, noses pressed up against the window of lifestyle shows on 
 TV. (Toynbee, 2005, p.9) 
 
If the determinants of population health in wealthy countries include the quality of social 
relations, then it follows that the identification of possible solutions is not to be found in 
material levels of poverty or absolute income, but instead in the various psycho-social 
status factors that influence our personal happiness and wellbeing. Layard (2005) 
argues that a range of factors such as family life, work-life balance, community and 
friends, health, personal freedom and values are most likely to determine a person’s 
general wellbeing. Layard draws on a variety of published studies to further argue that 
principal causes of falling social cohesion and rising social disorder are social and 
                                                
14 An explanation may be found in evolutionary theory, as outlined in Wilkinson’s remarkable study.  He 
notes that two types of social organisation have been identified by anthropologists: those based on 
hierarchy and power (agonic), and those based on co-operation (hedonic).   Although the former may be 
associated with class based societies that are predominant in the historical context, humanity evolved 
and lived for a far longer period in hunter-gatherer – or hedonic –groups. This evolutionary background 
appears to have profound contemporary consequences: it is arguably an important factor in explaining 
why not only mortality but other social ills including violence are all positively correlated with societal 
inequality. 
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institutional structures that drive inequality by promoting materialism and status 
competition. 
 
Drawing much of this evidence together, Wilkinson (2005) has constructed a conceptual 
model (see Figure 1 below) that attempts to identify causal ‘pathways’ between income 
inequality and social and physical wellbeing: 
 
Figure 1:The effects of income inequality on social and psychological well-being 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Source: adapted from Wilkinson (2005, p.23) 
 
Tracing the pathway of causality back from negative social outcomes through to the 
quality of social relations, one eventually reaches the question of what – if anything – 
represents an underlying causal variable. A notable, if arguably broad brush, feature of 
the Wilkinson model is the identification of ‘external economic influences’ as a possible 
driver of poverty and income inequality. From this perspective, income inequality may 
itself become a mere intervening variable that obscures a much more systemic issue of 
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profound political significance in which the features of Anglo-American capitalism, and 
its accounting and finance culture are of central significance.15  
 
  
Conclusion  
 
In this paper we have presented the results of the Collison et al. (2007) study as a 
social account that can inform the “varieties of capitalism” debate at a time when neo-
liberal policies are accentuating inequality and its social impacts.  We have posited a 
context for challenging the uncritical championing of the Anglo-American socio-
economic culture and its shareholder value focus. In this sense, this study may be 
viewed as a ‘shadow account’.  The capacity of silent or shadow accounting to act as a 
problematising technology in the context of the specific social indicators emphasised in 
this paper depends upon the successful creation of new visibilities that challenge the 
dominant and contestable values and rationalities underlying shareholder oriented 
capitalism.  We would argue that the social account supporting such a challenge could 
be important in confronting the assumptions and spurious rationalities embodied in 
“Anglo” accounting and finance theory and practice.  It should therefore be of particular 
relevance to students, educators, and practitioners of accounting and finance. 
 
Social indicators that have resonance and impact for the wider community have a 
potential for emancipatory effect.  Following publication of the initial Collison et al. study 
in the spring of 2007, a number of media outlets picked up on the findings, most notably 
several UK newspapers, which published articles highlighting the main findings. The 
reporting of the UK’s relatively poor performance in terms of child mortality and its 
relative worsening over recent decades was not a model of journalistic precision.   For 
example the Independent on Sunday headed its coverage “Rise in UK’s Child Mortality 
(sic) is Linked to Inequality” (Dobson, 2007) although it did include a novel and accurate 
characterisation of some of the findings:  
 
“Britain has the second highest child death rate among the 24 richest 
countries in the world, with infants in the UK twice as likely to die before the 
age of five as children in Sweden…” 
 
The headline of the Herald’s article confused relative and absolute information: “Wealth 
Gap Blamed as UK Child Mortality Rates Soar” (Puttick, 2007).  Some of its reporting 
included unduly assertive, if not wholly unfounded, reference to possible causal factors.  
(These had been discussed in more cautiously expressed terms during a telephone 
interview with one of the authors.)   
 
                                                
15 The existence of a causal link between specific economic and business cultures  and the overall quality 
of social relations has also been pursued by other commentators who have criticised the ‘selfish’ 
capitalism of Anglo-American economies (James, 2008; see also Coburn, 2004;  and Navarro, 2006). 
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“Britain has one of the highest child mortality rates in the developed world 
because of a growing gap between rich and poor… the nation is so focused 
on profitable business that society takes a back seat, leading to more child 
deaths… “ 
 
Similarly unrestrained language was found in coverage by one of the UK’s most well 
known “tabloid” newspapers: “UK in Child Mortality Shocker”, (Sun, 2007).  The article 
went on to say “The UK has one of the developed world’s worst child death rates 
because Brits focus on business rather than people…” 
 
A key issue of relevance to this discussion is the nature of wider public attitudes 
to inequality. These can seem ambiguous and contradictory: while most people in the 
UK agree that the gap between rich and poor is too wide, far fewer support the use of 
redistribution as a political remedy for inequality (Orton and Rowlingson, 2007). Castell 
and Thompson (2007) found that, when faced with factual information about the extent 
of poverty in the UK, the more affluent participants in their focus groups argued ‘to the 
point of absurdity’ that people are in poverty because of the choices they make. At the 
same time, those in poverty did not necessarily support redistributive policies that would 
benefit them. To address these findings, the Fabian Society (2005) argued that 
education was needed to combat ignorance and stereotypes of poverty, and proposed 
that cross-national comparisons be brought to the debate. They found that people in 
their focus groups were shocked when shown where the UK stood in relation to other 
countries in terms of children’s life chances and levels of poverty.  This suggest that an 
account of the type presented in the Collison et al. study is arguably effective not only 
because of the way it both critiques and subverts the dominant rationality of Anglo-
American capitalism and neo-liberalism, but because it also strikes a chord with a 
(reassuringly persistent) level of public sentiment towards notions of equality and a 
‘common good’.     
The mantra of the relative success of the Anglo-American business model, and 
its highly constrained form of financial accountability, may be put into some perspective 
by consideration of the broader social account adduced in this paper.  The under-five 
mortality rate is clearly a critical indicator of the well being of children, and of social 
cohesion generally.  Also, unlike some other measures of social disadvantage or 
inequality it is an absolute measure.  A widening divide between rich and poor may be 
“defended” on the grounds that the poor may be getting better off in absolute terms – no 
such case applies to the U5MR.  And, as discussed above, such arguments ignore the 
strong evidence about the malign influence of relative inequality itself. It is 
acknowledged that social indicators are complex matters that result from the interaction 
of many complex cultural and economic factors (see, for example, Micklewright and 
Stewart, 1999; Sen, 2000), and that individual metrics have their limitations, but the 
stark empirical evidence, as well as a priori reasoning, point to breathtaking hubris in 
the championing of the Anglo-American business model and the neo-liberalism which it 
fosters.  It especially highlights the dangers faced by social market economies which 
are at risk from its economic imperialism – and to a form of defence which shadow 
accounts in particular, and improved accountability in general, based on a more 
comprehensive social account could provide.  
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